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Theory of Workmen's Compensation
By

ARTHUR

B.

HONNOLD'

The statement of a definite theory or pttrpose by which the various
Workmen's Compensation Laws may be tested and their adequacies
and inadequacies determined, though interesting, presents many
difficulties. The state legislatures have generally avoided making
any such statement, doubtless realizing their present inability to
frame a statute which will measure up to it. The general purpose of
these acts, however, has been to remedy existing evils arising out of
the relation of employer and employe. With the advance in industrial life, and the increased use of machinery, increasing the hazard
to life and limb, the number of injuries to workmen multiplied. The
relief afforded by the common law rules proved very inadequate. As
said by Governor Hughes in his message to the Legislature of New
York, the rules of law governing legal liability prior to the enactment
of the Workmen's Compensation Law of that state, could not but
"offend the common sense of fairness."
The common law remedy by action involved intolerable delay and
great economic waste and proved wholly unsuited to the conditions of
modem industry, whether viewed from the standpoint of employer or
employe. The injured employe, in order to secure relief, was obliged
to resort to long drawn out and expensive litigation wherein the
employer had the advantage of numerous technical defenses. The
employe, being the plaintiff, had the burden of proving that the
employer was negligent and that the injury proximately resulted
from such negligence. This, of course, was very difficult. Yet,
accidents and injuries to employes, particularly those engaged in
hazardous employments, or working about dangerous machinery,
were inevitable. In fact, it could approximately be determined in
advance what would be the number of accidents in any particular
employment. With each succeeding year, the number of these
accidents increased. Breakage of the human machine was just as
certain to occur as breakage of the machinery used in carrying on
industries. The average employe, being without means to maintain
an action, fell a prey, in numerous cases, to unscrupulous lawyers;
"ambulance chasing" and maintenance became common. Certain
lawyers spepializing in this class of business even established and
maintained hospitals where the injured employe was given care.
Their object was not humanitarian, however, but was merely to place
'Member of the Oklahoma Bar, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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themselves in a position where they could secure the bigger share of
any recovery had by the injured employe against his employer. The
employe who did not have assistance of this or like nature had small
chance of being able to prosecute a suit to a successful conclusion.
The employer, in all too many cases, succeeded by showing that the
employe assumed the risk by entering an employment which he knew
to be hazardous, or by working about machinery which he knew to
be defective. This occurred although the necessities of the employe
and his family had forced him to accept the employment. Another
favorite defense was contributory negligence. If an employe, through
over-work or failure, from whatever cause, to give that constant attention to his work which would have prevented any accident, was
injured, the employer could defeat recovery. Even where death
resulted, or where the employe was rendered a total physical wreck,
many an employer prevailed on this theory, even though it is preposterous to assume that any employe would be intentionally guilty
of contributory negligence where the result must necessarily be so disasterous. Another defense was that based on the fellow servant doctrine whereby the employer was relieved from liability, if the injury
was due to the negligence of a fellow servant of the injured employe.
In case the employe was able to get through these legal barriers and to
the jury under instructions which would permit a finding in his favor,
there was great likelihood that the verdict would be so excessive that
it must be set aside as contrary to law.
On the other hand, the employer was put to great expense by these
suits, in the employment of counsel and the expenditures involved in
preparing for trial, in many cases more than he would have'been
obliged to pay had there been some established basis on which he could
have settled with the employe in the first instance. This money,
instead of going to further the industry out of which the accident
arose, was withdrawn from the industry without resulting benefit to
either the employer or employe. Some employers came'to the conclusion, which may or may not have been erroneous but in either case
was reprehensible, that it would be cheaper to ran the risk of being
held liable for accidents than to install improved machinery and
proper safe-guards. It was to remedy these and other evils that the
Workmen's Compensation Laws were enacted.
I now call to mind four state laws, which contain declarations of
their purposes. In one it is
"declared and determined to be contrary to public policy that
any employer conducting any especially dangerous industry
* * * shall fail to exercise due care, or fail to comply with
any law affecting such employment, in such manner as to
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endanger the lives and safety of enployes thereof, without
assuming the burden of the financial loss through disability
entailed upon such enployes, or their dependents, through such
failure;"

and is further declared to be contrary to public policy
"that the burden of financial loss to employes in such dangerous employments, or of their dependents, due to injuries * * *
shall be borne by said employes without due compensation paid
* * * by the employer." 2
The conditions calling for the enactment of another state law are
declared to be a recognition
"that the prosecution of the various industrial enterprises,
which muast be relied upon to create and preserve the wealth and
the prosperity of the State involves the injury of large numbers
of workmen, resulting in their partial or total incapacity or
death, and that under the rules of the common law and the provisions of the statutes now in force an unequal burden is cast upon
its citizens, and that in determining the responsibility of the
employer on account of injuries sustained by his workmen, a great.
and unnecessary cost is now incurred -in litigation, which cost is
divided between the workmen, the employers and the taxpayers,
who provide the public funds, without any corresponding benefit,
to maintain courts and juries to determine the question of responsibility under the law as it now exists, and that the State and its
taxpayers are subjected to a heavy burdefi in providing care and
support for such injured workmen and their dependents, and that
this burden should, in so far as may be consistent with the rights
and obligations of the people of the State, be more fairly distributed as in this Act provided." 3
This particular Act provides for a state insurance fund, to which
employers coming under the law are required to contribute.
Another state law declares that the common law system "is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions," and that in practice it
proves to be economically unwise and unfair. It further states,
relative to this system,
"Its administration has produced the result that little of the
cost of the employer has reached the workman and that little
only at large expense to-the public. The remedy of the workman has been uncertain, slow and inadequate. Injuries in such
works, formerly occasional, have become frequent and inevitable.
The welfare of the state depends upon its industries, and even
more upon the welfare of its wage-worker. The state * * *
declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from
private controversy, and sure and certain relief for workmen,
sWorkmen's Compensation Act of Arizona, Section 5.
$Workmen's Compensation Act of Oregon, Section x.
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injured in extra hazardous work, and their families and dependents is hereby provided, regardless of questions of fault and to the
exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation,
except as otherwise provided in this Act."4
But what is probably the most complete declaration of purpose is
contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act of Maryland. The
enacting clause of this act reads as follows:
"Whereas, the State of Maryland recognizes that the prosecution of various industrial enterprises which must be relied upon to
create and preserve the wealth and prosperity of the State
involves injury to large numbers of workmen, resulting in their
partial or total incapacity or death, and that under the rules of
the common law and the provisions of the statutes now in force
an unequal burden is cast upon its citizens, and that in determining the responsibility of the employer on account of injuries sustainedby hisworkmen, great andunnecessary cost is nowincurred
in litigation, which cost is borne by the workmen, the employers
and the taxpayers, in part, in the maintenance of courts and
juries to determine the question of responsibility under the law as
it now exists; and
" Whereas,-in addition thereto, the State and its taxpayers are
subjected to a heavy burden in providing care- and support for
such injured workmen and their dependents, which burden
should, in so far as may be consistent with the rights and obligations of the people of the State, be more fairly distributed as in
this Act provided; and
"Whereas, the common law system governing the remedy of
workmen against employers for injuries received in extrahazardous work is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions;
and injuries in such work, formerly occasional, have now become
frequent and inevitable.
"Now, Therefore, The State of Maryland, exercising herein
its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of extrahazardous employments be, and they are hereby withdrawn from
private controversy, and sure and certain relief for workmen
injured in extra-hazardous employments and their families and
dependents are hereby provided for, regardless of questions of
fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, except as provided in this Act."
While these statutes attempt a declaration of purposes, there is no
doubt but that the same purposes actuated the legislatures in the
enactment of similar laws in other states. In fact, as complete a
declaration may be arrived at from a study of decisions rendered by
the courts of some of these other states. These decisions, covering
generally the purposes above stated, have declared the purpose to be
to abolish the common law system because inadequate to meet
'Workmen's Compensation Act of Washington, Section i.
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modem conditions and conceptions of moral obligations and substitute
therefor a system based on a high conception of man's obligation to
his fellow man, a system recognizing every injury to an employe
which is not self-inflicted as an element of the cost of production to
be charged to the industry, rather than to the individual employer,
and liquidated in the steps ending with consumption, so that the
burden is finally borne by the community in general. In other words,
they declare that the workmen's compensation legislation is based on
the economic principle of trade risk in that personal injury losses
incident to industrial pursuits are, like wages and breakage of machinery, a part of the cost of production.5 These laws are humane
remedial enactments intended to give vitality to the idea that
personal injury losses incident to an employe's services are as much a
part of the labor cost of such services as wages paid, and should in
some practicable way-be so treated.6 In New York, it has been
declared that the theory of the law, and of the underlying constitutional auth6rization, is that the accidents growing out of the operation
of industrial enterprises become a legitimate part of what is known in
commercial life as the "overhead cost."7
Probably one of the best statements of the reason for the departure
from long-established custom, in the enactment of workmen's compensation laws, is the summary contained in the report of the Wainwright Commission to the New York Legislature, which reads, as
follows:
"First, that the present system in New York rests on a basis
that is economically unwise and unfair, and that in operation it
is wasteful, uncertain, and productive of antagonism between
workmen and employers. Second, that it is satisfactory to
none, and tolerable only to those employers and worknen who
practically disregard their legal rights and obligations, and fairly
share the burden of accidents in industries. Third, that the evils
of the system are mostmarked in hazardous employments, where
the trade risk is high and serious accidents frequent. Fourth,
that, as matter of fact, worknen in the dangerous trades do not,
and practically cannot, provide for themselves adequate accident
insurance, ond therefore the burden of serious accidents falls on
the workmen least able to bear it, and brings many of them and
their families to want * * * These results can, we think, be
best avoided by conipelling the eniployer to share the accident
burden in intrinsicall dangerous trades, since by fixing the price
of his product the shock of the accident may be borne by the
community. In those employments which have not so great an
Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8 (1915).
'Village of Kiel v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 158 N. W., (Wis.) 68
(1916); Western Indemnity v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 (1915); State v. Clausen,
65'Allen
Wash.v. State,
I56
(19 I60 N. Y. Supp. 85 (1916).)).

THEORY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
element of danger, in which, speaking generally, there is no such
imperative demand for the exercise of the police power of the
state for the safeguarding of its workers from destitution and its
consequences, we recommend, as the first step in this change of
system, such amendment of the present law as will do away with
some of its unfairness in theory and practice, and increase the
workmen's chance of recovery under the law. With such
changes in the law we couple an elective plan of compensation,
which, if generally adopted, will do away with many of the evils
of the present system. Its adoption will, we believe, be profitable
to both employer and employe, and prove to be the simplest
way for the state to change its system of liability without disturbance of industrial conditions. Not the least of the motives
moving us is the hope that by these means a source of antagonism
between employer and employed, pregnant with danger for the
state, may be elinlinated."
The legislation by which it has been sought to remedy the evils in
the old system by substituting a new system in place thereof, has
followed one general course. Some of the first laws were compulsory.
That is, employer and employe came within their terms and were
governed by them, whether they willed it or not, but doubt as to the
constitutionality of a compulsory system of compensation brought
about the enactment of elective Acts by which employer and employe
were given a right to elect whether or not they would come under the
Acts. These Acts, however, are made to partake as much as possible
of the compulsory feature. Election to come under them results as a
rule from silence or failure to give notice of an election to the contrary. This was very proper as to an employe, particularly since one
seeking employment cannot at that instant be expected to dictate to
his employer the law which shall govern their relations. In many
instances, such dictation would no doubt result in failure to secure the
employment sought. Election to come under the Act is also encouraged by a sort of a mild coercion whereby the employer who does not
so elect, is deprived of his common law defenses,-assumption of risk,
contributory negligence and fellow servant doctrine,-in case action
be bxought against him for injuries to an employe.
In proceedings under a Workmen's Compensation Act, these
defenses, not being given by the Act, do not exist. Compensation is
awarded regardless of any question as to whether the injury resulted
from the employer's fault and regardless of any contributory negligence of the employe, unless suchnegligence be serious and wilful.
The expensive procedure and technicalities of the ordinary law suit
are avoided by establishing simple methods by which compensation
may be recovered. In many states, special boards are provided for,
and in others it is provided that the court shall act summarily, free
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from the technicalities of the ordinary lawsuit in passing upon a claim
for compensation.
It has as yet been possible, however, only to lessen litigation on this
subject, not to abolish it. The construction and application of the
terms used in these Acts have given rise to new controversies, many of
which cannot be definitely settled for all cases, but must be determined
under the facts of each particular case. For example, what constitutes "an accident," has proven a difficult question, and in answering
it, the courts at various times have lost sight of the purpose of the
law. In one case, a workman, whose toe was frozen, while he was
engaged for several hours in shoveling snow from the side walk, was
held by the lower court not to have been injured by an accident, since
there was no force involved, in the technical sense of-that term; but I
am pleased to say that the reviewing court reversed this decision.
Diseases which are compensable, because due to accident, have with
difficulty been distinguished from diseases not compensable. But the
question presenting the greatest difficulty has been whether the
injury "arose out of and in the course of the employment." One act,
at least, avoided using this phrase because (as declared by the
Supreme Court of that State) of the controversies which had &risen
from its use in other states, but I doubt if this served to better the
situation. The substitute phrase used in that state has likewise
given rise to controversy which must be determined without the aid
of those precedents established by decisions construing and applying
the phrase quoted.
Numerous decisions in this country and in England have drawn a
careful distinction between the phrases "in course of" and "out of."
The Ohio Act uses only the first of these phrases, and if the decisions
by the courts of other states were applied to its construction, the conclusion would be that an accident is compensable where it arises in the
course of, though it does not arise out of, the employment; but the
Supreme Court of that Stateheld otherwise. It heldthat this law did
not cover any injury which had its cause outside of and disconnected
with the employment, although the employe may at the time have
been engaged in the work of his employer in the usual way.,
The compensation authorized by the various Workmen's Compensation Laws is based on the average earnings of the employe. The
object has been to fix a definite amount to be allowed for each injury
and remove from the field of controversy all question in respect
thereto. To attain this object has presented a dilemma. Too large
an allowance might lead to malingering, since it cannot be denied
that there are employes who would prefer to remain idle on approximsFassig v. State, 95 Oh. St. 232

(1917).
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ately full pay than to be at work. To guard against this evil, and
possibly for other reasons, the various legislatures have fixed the
compensation for temporary total disability at from fifty to sixty-six
and two-thirds per cent. of the average earning power of the employe.
It occurs to me that fifty per cent. is entirely too small an allowance.
It is too much like penalizing the employe in advance for malingering,
which he may or may not be guilty of. I make mention only of the
allowance for temporary disability, but these remarks are equally
applicable to permanent disabilities and scheduled injuries. Too
low an award tends, it is true, to lessen litigation, inasmuch as the
amount involved is scarcely worth going into court for. It is also
true that if the compensation recoverable is small, the employe would
rather sacrifice his right to the same than lose his employment as a
result of antagonizing his employer. A statutory regulation of
attorney fees at a maximum at which competent counsel cannot be
secured operates against the interests of the employe and marks an
extreme due to the above mentioned form of abuse in this respect.
Two remedies, in addition to the allowance of reasonably adequate
fees in contested cases, suggest themselves in this connection: first,an allowance of adequate compensation which approaches as nearly
one hundred per cent. of the loss as is possible without actually inviting malingering; second,-to require employers to report all accidents
and injuries therefrom to the tribunal vested with power of administering the Workmen's Compensation Law, and make it the duty of
this tribunal to take the initiative in protecting the employe for whose
protection the law was designed. Some states have already taken
advanced steps in this direction. I know of instances where employers, having a regard for the welfare and best interest of their employes,
have adopted the practice of paying full wages to their employes
during temporary disability, even though the Workmen's Compensation Law of the state requires the payment of only fifty per cent. They,
of course, realizethat the compensation allowedby the lawis inadequate.
Employers will welcome changes to the advantage of the employe
when there has been time for such readjustment of industries that the
cost of compensation is in reality added to the price of the finished
product and the burden borne by the ultimate consumer. I do not
doubt but that eventually all these laws will have been so framed or
modified as to truly conform to the theory on which they are based
and effectuate to the greatest possible extent the purpose for which
they were enacted. In so far as they operate justly and equitably,
giving to the injured employe no more and no less than he is entitled
to, they will engender that much desired good will and spirit of co-operation between the two classes directly affected by their operation.

